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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43706 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-3098 
v.     ) 
     ) 
DANIEL JOSEPH SMITH,  ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) IN SUPPORT OF  
 Defendant-Appellant. ) PETITION FOR REHEARING 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Daniel Smith asks the Idaho Court of Appeals to rehear this case, as he submits 
the opinion, 2016 Opinion No.55 (Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2016) (hereinafter, Opinion), which 
affirms, inter alia, the order denying his motion for counsel on his motion for sentence 
reduction pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b) (hereinafter, Rule 35), is inconsistent with Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent in two respects.  First, he contends it did not address one of 
the arguments actually raised on appeal, and so, is inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 328 (2008) (“This Court would 
be delinquent in its duties if it failed to address the actual issues on appeal . . . .”).  
Second, he contends the ultimate holding of the Opinion – that his Rule 35 motion was 
frivolous – is inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Wersland, 
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125 Idaho 499, 504-05 (1994), and State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 223 (2008).  Both 
those decisions involved information similar to what Mr. Smith presented with his 
motion, and the Supreme Court explained that information fulfilled the requirement that 
a Rule 35 motion be accompanied by new or additional information.  For either reason, 
this Court should grant rehearing in this case. 
 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 The district court had imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with three 
years fixed, and refused to retain jurisdiction following Mr. Smith’s plea of guilty to 
possession of methamphetamine.1  (Tr., p.20, Ls.1-20.)2  Mr. Smith sought to file a Rule 
35 motion asking for leniency, and he requested the assistance of counsel to help him 
prepare and present that motion.  (R., pp.131-40, 159-60.)      
Mr. Smith was particularly concerned that, during the sentencing hearing, the 
district court considered the fact that “he engaged in reckless activity which resulted in 
certain sexually transmitted diseases, actually a number of them, and I found myself 
wondering between 2014 and his current arrest how many others were inflicted [sic] by 
this reckless behavior,” as an aggravating factor.3  (Tr., p.18, Ls.14-19; R., pp.142-43.)  
As such, Mr. Smith sought to present information in his Rule 35 motion to demonstrate 
that the district court’s concern was unfounded:  that, since being first diagnosed with 
                                            
1 The district court also imposed a concurrent sentence of 180 days on a misdemeanor 
charge of resisting arrest.  (Tr., p.20, Ls.7-9.) 
2 While the transcripts in this case are provided in two separately bound and paginated 
volumes, all references to “Tr.” herein are to the volume containing the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing held on October 1, 2015. 
3 The Presentence Investigation (hereinafter, PSI) had mentioned Mr. Smith’s behavior 
during that time in the context of Mr. Smith concluding, upon reflection following 
his diagnosis in 2015, that was the time during which he likely had become infected with 
HIV.  (PSI, p.12.)  
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HIV, “I have followed the recommendations of my doctors, have taken steps to prevent 
further spread of the disease, am correctly medicated and am continuing proper 
treatment recommended by health professionals.”  (R., p.143.) 
Mr. Smith also wanted to address the district court’s concern over his prior 
struggles with rehabilitative programming.  (See Tr., p.18, Ls.18-12.)  As such, he 
sought to present additional information about his amenability to treatment:  that his 
diagnosis combined with his brother’s suicide during the brother’s own relapse the day 
Mr. Smith had been arrested had “a profound impact on my attitude and outlook on life.  
I have never been more determined to turn my back on a lifestyle that has cost myself 
and my family so much.”  (R., p.144.)   
Finally, he was concerned that the district court had exceeded the prosecutor’s 
recommendations for sentencing.  (See R., p.142.)  In exchange for Mr. Smith’s guilty 
plea, the prosecutor had agreed to recommend a unified sentence of seven years, with 
two years fixed, and to recommend that the district court retain jurisdiction.  (See, e.g., 
Tr., p.6, Ls.5-7.)  As such, Mr. Smith asked the district court to reduce his sentence so 
that it conformed to the prosecutor’s recommendations.  (See R., p.146.) 
The district court denied Mr. Smith’s motion for appointment of counsel on his 
Rule 35 motion, concluding the motion was frivolous:  “it appears a reasonable person 
with adequate means would not be willing to retain counsel at his or her own expense to 
conduct a further investigation into Defendant’s claims.”  (R., p.160.)  It then proceeded 
to deny his motion on the merits without a hearing.  (R., pp.161-65.)  Specifically, it 
explained that, because the current case represented Mr. Smith’s fourth felony 
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conviction, and because he had struggled with prior rehabilitative opportunities, the 
sentence as originally imposed was appropriate.  (R., p.164.) 
By the time the district court entered its order denying his Rule 35 motion, 
Mr. Smith had already filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  
(See R., pp.149-52.)  On appeal, he argued that, because Rule 35 is a critical stage of 
the criminal process, counsel was needed to do more than just investigate his claims.  
(App. Br., pp.5, 9-10.)  Thus, he contended counsel should have been appointed to help 
him present his Rule 35 motion, which was not frivolous because there was new or 
additional information in two respects.  (App. Br., pp.6-8.) 
First, he explained the information about his efforts to reduce his risk of 
spreading his disease had not been before the district court at the sentencing hearing, 
and, based on that information, the district court’s concern about spreading his disease 
was unfounded.  (App. Br., p.7.)  Second, he argued that he presented new or 
additional information about the change in his amenability to treatment by explaining the 
effects of the combination of his diagnosis and his brother’s recent suicide changed his 
amenability to treatment.  (App. Br., p.8.) 
The State responded that Mr. Smith had been aware of this information at the 
time of the sentencing hearing.  (Resp. Br., pp.3-4.)  As a result, relying on this Court’s 
decision in State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522 (Ct. App. 1994), the State argued that, 
because Mr. Smith had not presented that information at the sentencing hearing, he 
could not now base his Rule 35 motion on that information.  (See Resp. Br., pp.3-4.)   
Mr. Smith replied that, in subsequent decisions such as State v. Person, 145 
Idaho 293 (Ct. App. 2007), this Court explained the Wade rule was limited to situations 
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where the defendant had stipulated to a particular sentence recommendation as part of 
a plea agreement.  (Reply Br., pp.3-6.)  Because Mr. Smith had not stipulated to such a 
recommendation, he argued Wade was inapplicable to his case.  (Reply Br., pp.3-6.)  
Rather, he argued his case was similar to Idaho Supreme Court decisions, such as 
State v. Wersland and State v. Arthur, in which the Idaho Supreme Court explained that 
information similar to that Mr. Smith had presented with his motion constituted new or 
additional information in the Rule 35 context.  (Reply Br., pp.5-6.) 
This Court concluded that “[t]he crux of [Mr.] Smith’s Rule 35 motion is that 
certain circumstances, i.e., his disease and his brother’s suicide, have made him 
amenable to treatment.”  (Opinion, p.3.)  Because this Court concluded the district court 
had been aware of the individual facts – that Mr. Smith had been diagnosed with HIV 
and that his brother had committed suicide – and that the district court had considered 
Mr. Smith’s amenability to treatment when imposing sentence, this Court concluded his 
Rule 35 motion was frivolous.  (Opinion, p.3.)  As a result, this Court affirmed the order 
denying Mr. Smith’s motion for appointment of counsel.  (Opinion, p.3.)  It then held the 
district court had not abused its discretion by denying Mr. Smith’s motion on its merits.  
(Opinion, p.4.)  The Opinion did not address the argument about whether Mr. Smith 
could properly base his Rule 35 motion on the information about his behavior upon 
receiving his diagnosis, of which he had been aware, but which had not been before the 
district court, at sentencing.  (See generally Opinion.)   




Whether this Court should grant rehearing to address the arguments actually raised in 





This Court Should Grant Rehearing To Address The Arguments Actually Raised In This 




A. Standard For Evaluating Petitions For Rehearing 
Idaho Appellate Rule 116, which governs petitions for rehearing before the Idaho 
Court of Appeal, provides:  “Any party to a proceeding aggrieved by opinion or order of 
the Court of Appeals may thereafter petition to that court for a rehearing in the same 
manner, within the same time limits, upon the same grounds, and with the same effect 
as a petition for rehearing to the Supreme Court under the Appellate Rules.”  I.A.R. 116.  
Idaho Appellate Rule 42 governs petitions for rehearing in the Idaho Supreme Court, but 
it does not identify the grounds for granting such petitions.  See I.A.R. 42.  However, 
Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b), which governs petitions for review to the Supreme Court, 
provides that such petitions may be granted in the Court’s discretion “when there are 
special and important reasons” for doing so.  I.A.R. 118(b).  It also identifies five factors 
which should be considered in making that decision.  Id.  Since petitions for rehearing 
and review serve similar policy goals, the criteria for granting petitions for review set 
forth in Rule 118(b) should apply equally to petitions for rehearing.   
Accordingly, Mr. Smith contends that the decision whether to grant his petition for 
rehearing lies within the sound discretion of this Court, but that his petition should be 
granted because there are special and important reasons for doing so.  Specifically, he 
asserts the Opinion fails to address one of the arguments raised on appeal and, as a 
result, is inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Lovitt v. Robideaux.  
Additionally, he contends the ultimate holding – that his Rule 35 motion was frivolous – 
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is inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Wersland and 
State v. Arthur. 
 
B. The Opinion Did Not Address One Of The Issues Actually Raised On Appeal 
 
The Idaho Supreme Court has noted that “[t]his Court would be delinquent in its 
duties if it failed to address the actual issues on appeal . . . .”  Lovitt, 139 Idaho at 328.  
The Opinion in this case focused on only one of the arguments raised on appeal – 
whether Mr. Smith presented new or additional information about his amenability to 
treatment, in that it was higher than it had been before due to his recent HIV diagnosis 
combined with his brother’s recent suicide.  (Opinion, p.3.)  This Court held that, 
because the district court was aware of the independent facts at the time of sentencing, 
none of it was new or additional information before the court.  (Opinion, p.3.)  
Additionally, it held that, being aware of that information, the district court had already 
considered the issue at “the crux” of Mr. Smith’s motion.  (Opinion, p.3.) 
However, that was only one of the arguments Mr. Smith raised on appeal.  His 
other argument was that his Rule 35 motion was not frivolous because he had 
presented information which had not been before the district court at the sentencing 
hearing about his efforts to reduce his risk of spreading his disease, contradicting the 
concern the district court had voiced and relied upon at the sentencing hearing.  (App. 
Br., p.7.)  The State’s response to that argument was that he could not base his motion 
on that information even though it had not been before the district court at sentencing 
because:   
All of this was information that was in [Mr.] Smith’s and his counsel’s 
possession at the time of sentencing (in October 2015) and, as such, was 
not new or additional information.  See Wade, 125 Idaho at 526, 873 P.2d 
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at 171 (information in the possession of defendant and counsel at the time 
of sentencing “is not new or additional information” when later submitted in 
support of a Rule 35 motion for sentence reduction). 
 
(Resp. Br., p.3.)  Mr. Smith replied that Wade was inapplicable to the facts of his case 
and the Idaho Supreme Court has previously found similar information could satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 35.  (Reply Br., pp.5-6 (citing Arthur, 145 Idaho at 223 and 
Wersland, 125 Idaho at 504-05).)  In fact, as this issue dominated both the Response 
and Reply Briefs, it, and not the issue about the change in his amenability to treatment, 
was the “crux” of the arguments on appeal.  (Compare Opinion, p.3.) 
The analysis in the Opinion does not address this other issue.  For example, the 
fact that the district court was aware of Mr. Smith’s diagnosis does not show that its 
concern about Mr. Smith’s behavior in light of that diagnosis was proper.  Similarly, the 
conclusion that the district court considered Mr. Smith’s amenability to treatment does 
not tend to show that the information Mr. Smith presented to refute the district court’s 
concern about his behavior in light of his diagnosis had been before the district court at 
sentencing.   
Since the Opinion has not addressed the issues which had actually been raised 
on appeal, it is inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Lovitt.  As such, 
this Court should grant rehearing in this case.   
 
C. The Ultimate Conclusion That Mr. Smith’s Motion Is Frivolous Is Inconsistent 
With Idaho Supreme Court Precedent 
 
The Opinion affirmed the order dismissing Mr. Smith’s request for counsel based 
on its conclusion that his motion was frivolous.  (Opinion, p.3.)  However, as noted 
supra, the Idaho Supreme Court has found similar information will satisfy the 
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requirements for Rule 35 motions.  That means, when a Rule 35 motion is accompanied 
by such information, it is not frivolous.   
For example, in State v. Wersland, the defendant presented information that her 
husband had been undergoing mental health care for two years prior to her sentencing 
hearing and that his condition had been exacerbated by the sentencing decision.  
Wersland, 125 Idaho at 504.  The Idaho Supreme Court held the district court properly 
weighed that “new information regarding the mental and emotional health of Wersland’s 
husband,” in deciding to deny the defendant’s request for leniency.  Id. at 505.  As such, 
even though the fact of diagnosis was known the defendant prior to sentencing, the 
defendant still fulfilled the requirements of Rule 35 when she presented thereto-
unpresented information about that diagnosis with her motion.   
Similarly, in State v. Arthur, the defendant “present[ed] new information to the 
district court that he was seriously ill” and he “submitted medical records showing his 
current medical status and the care he was receiving for his terminal illness while 
incarcerated.”4  Arthur, 145 Idaho at 221, 223.  The Supreme Court concluded, “Arthur 
supported his Rule 35 motion with additional information.”  Id. at 223.  Because the 
information he presented about his diagnosis and treatment was new to the district 
court, it was sufficient to be the basis for a reduction of his sentence pursuant to 
Rule 35.  Id.   
Similarly, Mr. Smith presented information about his diagnosis and treatment – 
that, upon receiving his diagnosis, he had made efforts to adhere to this doctors’ 
                                            
4 The Arthur Opinion is not clear as to whether this information referred to a new 
diagnosis made after sentencing, or just that the defendant was receiving new treatment 
while in custody.  See generally Arthur, 145 Idaho 219.   
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recommendations to reduce his risk of spreading his disease – and that information had 
not been before the district court at sentencing.  As such, the information he proffered in 
support of his motion was sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 35, which means 
his motion was not frivolous.   
Additionally, at a more fundamental level, if the district court relies on a concern 
at sentencing, but that concern is based on an inaccurate understanding of the relevant 
facts, a reasonable person would undoubtedly be willing to hire counsel to pursue a 
motion to reconsider the sentence based upon a clarification of the relevant facts, which 
means such a motion is not frivolous.  That is precisely the sort of argument Mr. Smith 
sought to pursue, and he presented heretofore-unpresented information to clarify the 
relevant facts.   
Because the Opinion’s ultimate conclusion – that Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion was 
frivolous – is inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court precedent, this Court should grant 




 Mr. Smith respectfully requests this Court grant rehearing in this case.  Assuming 
it does so, he further requests it grant relief for the reasons set forth in the appellate 
briefs. 
 DATED this 12th day of September, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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